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1. Introduction: Psychological experiments and theoretical accounts of reasoning
Among a number of issues related to the overlap between experimental research
in psychology and the study of argumentation that have been raised in José Ángel Gascón’s
insightful paper, two questions seem to be of key importance: (i) what do some psychological
experiments about giving reasons really tell us about our reasoning?; and (ii) how can
philosophical distinctions between kinds of reasons help us understanding these experiments
along with their implications for argumentation theory? Gascón’s point of departure is the
observed gap between how we usually justify our decisions and what the results of
psychological experiments tell us about our ability to give good reasons. Those experiments
seem to suggest that people are very bad at pointing to ‘real’ reasons for their actions. In this
respect, Gascón’s contribution can be interpreted as combining results of research in cognitive
psychology with the tools of analytical philosophy, specifically with the conceptual
framework that captures normative, motivating, and explanatory reasons.
I am sympathetic to this approach, especially because of the Authors’s clear and
systematic attempt at finding a proper balance between (i) the experimental research that, by
collecting empirical material may help us focus on some so far unexplored communication
phenomena (which should be further informed by the theory of reasoning); and (ii) sketching
possible research directions for developing theoretical accounts that would be driven by
empirical research. Keeping in mind that Gascón emphasises that his paper provides the
reader with just initial answers to questions pointing to that overlap, what I find particularly
important is the answer to the question of which conclusions drawn from empirical research
on giving reasons can, to some extent, remodel some basic claims and distinctions in the
philosophy of argument? In order to outline an answer, in section 2 I will discuss some issues
related to one of the key distinctions made in the paper, namely the one between reasons and
causes. Next, in section 3, I will briefly focus on the issue of worries that argumentation
theorists may have once they have learnt about some results of experiments. This discussion
will lead to section 4, devoted to the issue of the place of argumentation theory within the
proposed approach. I will sum up in section 5 with an initial attempt at answering the question
about a possible linkage between the future research on the topic and the replicability problem
in behavioural sciences.
2. Reasons and causes for actions
Gascón formulates the main problem of the paper by asking a series of questions that address
Nisbet and Wilson’s experiments (1977) and their impact on studying reasons: “As a first
step, however, it would help to be clear about what exactly Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments
uncovered. Did they identify our real reasons for action? Or did they show us simply the
causes of our actions? Are they the same thing?” (p. 4). Having formulated this purpose,
Gascón develops his considerations in a clear and analytical manner, step-by-step defining
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terms and identifying issues that help explaining the standard description of the experiment
using claims and distinctions about the types of reasoning taken from the analytical tradition
(e.g., from the works of Audi, Davidson and Parfit).
What may draw readers’ attention in Gascón’s initial description of the experiments
conducted by Nisbett and Wilson is that causes for our actions seem to be at first glance
misleadingly associated with reasons for our actions. For example, the stockings experiment
in which the participants were asked to evaluate four pairs of stockings (which in fact were
identical) and then to justify their choices (the experiment has shown that the participants
were likely to choose the pair of stockings situated on the right hand side) Gascón states:
“However, when the participants were asked about the reasons for their choices, the position
of the article was never mentioned. In fact, when the researchers suggested that possibility to
the participants, they denied it” (p. 3). What may strike the reader of this passage is the fact
that the participants couldn’t point to the reason (associated here to a cause) if they weren’t
aware of it. To make this point more explicit, the reason I have given in order to justify my
action may be different from what caused that action. This confusion disappears as it is
further shown that the explanations of experiments start making more sense once we have
distinguished between reasons people give with the notion of factors that in fact influence
actions. Gascón shows that such confusions can be dealt with once the first ones can be in
some cases treated as motivating reasons, and others – as explanatory ones.
In other words, Gascón’s work helps us understand that, on the one hand, the
experiments may tell us something about our dis(ability) to give reasons, especially when we
don’t have the access to what really influenced our decision, and on the other hand, the very
description of these experiments seems to be lacking the application of basic types of reasons
(such as, in this case, our justifications for our actions and the causes of our actions). The
clear and detailed way in which Gascón identifies these gaps and shows concrete applications
of the philosophical distinction between the kinds of reasons, is itself a valuable contribution.
3. Should we be worried about the results of psychological experiments?
Gascón makes some general statements about possible worries we can have about the results
of this kind of experimental research. For example, on p. 2, he asks: “How worried should we
be by this conclusion?” (in this case about Sperber and Mercier’s statement that humans are
rationalization machines). The Author builds the whole line of argument around this question
by stating that the goal of the paper is to give a tentative answer to this question. Gascón
seems to interpret Nisbet and Wilson’s experiments (1977) as evidence proving that “we lack
introspective access to the reasons that guide our behaviour” (p. 3). One worrying implication
for critical thinking theorists could be that if that conclusion is typically true, then it would be
extremely difficult to train critical thinkers because we could never be sure that the reasons
such thinkers will be giving will be merely guesses.
Although I would not say that a result of a certain experiment related to giving reasons
should be immediately treated as a worry for argumentation scholars, in case of Gascón’s
contribution this does not seem to affect the results because the experiments are here, as far as
I can recognise, treated rather as an inspiration to propose a theoretical contribution that
concerns mostly the applicability of the distinction between the kinds of reasons. As I have
pointed out in Section 2, the very description of the experiments that mixes up kinds of
reasons without introducing basic distinctions is a very good reason itself to bring this issue
into attention in order to show that an argumentation theorist (with the help of some
distinctions taken from analytical philosophy) is capable of making sense of experimental
research. This observation may lead us to discussing in a slightly greater detail the question
about what is the place of argumentation theory within this approach.
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4. And Where’s Argumentation Theory?
As the challenge for argumentation theory would be to answer the question of how the
existing taxonomies of reasons relate to what cognitive psychology has to offer in terms of
conclusions drawn from some key experiments. Do they reveal anything new about the nature
of reasoning that should make the argumentation scholars adjust their taxonomies of
reasoning? Gascón’s paper clearly seeks for the balanced approach that would be both
theoretically informed by analytical philosophy and empirically driven by the results of
experimental research. However, in line with Section 2, an issue could be here raised about
the gap between our declared reasons and the genuine causes for our choices ruled by the
principles of social influence (e.g., Cialdini, 2001). Let us consider, as an example, the rule of
consequence, according to which I would follow the commitment I have made in the past and
I would try to rationalise this objectively bad decision by giving some other reasons. I agree
with Gascón that the distinction between motivating reasons (here: being consequent because
I think that acting consequently is a value in the social interaction with others) and the
explanatory reasons (here: the psychological mechanism of consequence bases on the rule of
influence I am not fully aware of). But how could this explication on my ‘consequent’
behaviour affect argumentation studies? In other words: in which way, and to which extent,
the fact learnt from empirical research in psychology that we sometimes neglect real reasons
for our actions should have impact on a theoretical account of giving reasons in
argumentation research?
Despite a detailed discussion of problems arising from the experimental research, what
I believe has not been made explicit in the paper are the detailed conclusions for
argumentation theory such as those related to answering questions like: given this particular
result of the experiment, do argumentation theorists have to change their conceptual
framework? Hence, I think that what could be made more explicit in the future inquiry is
indicating how exactly the conclusions drawn from experimental studies tell us about
redefining (if necessary) some particular tasks of argument analysts and evaluators. As
Gascón is well aware of the fact that he has just outlined some initial answers, this work, by
‘translating’ the results of psychological experiments into the language of the philosophy of
argument and reasoning, is a valuable source of inspiration for providing argumentation
scholars with a detailed instruction about how to apply the existing distinctions in philosophy
of reasoning to analytically approach the empirical data.
5. Methodological issues in experimental psychology and the empirical evidence for
giving reasons
Let me indicate yet another research perspective with posing a general question which is
related to the idea of treating experimental research in cognitive psychology as an inspiration
for developing some areas of argumentation theory. The discussions about the ‘replication
crisis’ in experimental social psychology and computational neuroscience (see. e.g.,
Hüffmeier et. al, 2016; Miłkowski et. al. 2018), along with other disciplines, thanks to the
critical assessment of reproducibility, have revealed some key methodological issues related
to experimental research. Although I do not think that the replication problem is the main
concern from the point of view of this paper, the following question about the general line of
the future inquiry into kinds of reasons may here arise: would such issues as the replication
crisis affect the research direction Gascón is proposing? If, for instance, it would be difficult
to replicate the results of a given experiment about giving reasons, would that make us to hold
on with drawing conclusions that could be crucial for the philosophical theories of reasoning
and argumentation studies until the results are replicated?
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If I correctly understood the core of Gascón’s contribution, the fact of whether or not
results of a particular experiment would be replicable is, at least at this stage of inquiry, less
important than giving an answer to the question: to what extent may the experiments inspire
argumentation theorists to incorporate their analytic conceptual framework for capturing
possible implications for the study of reasoning and thus to focus on some unexplored
theoretical issues? My view is that the first necessary step made in the direction initiated by
Gascón would be to collect most urgent issues that could serve as a valuable source of
inspiration for developing a more robust theoretically informed and empirically driven
taxonomy of kinds of reasons.
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